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2I. Introduction
This work will attempt to provide a brief reply and critique of Bruce Ackerman’s 
constitutionalism. Bruce Ackerman is the Sterling Professor of Law and Political Science 
at Yale University.  And he has been for the past quarter of a century actively engaged in 
the interpretation of the American Constitution.  His efforts have yielded deep insights 
into the politics of American Constitutionalism. As is natural with scholars and theorists 
that take on large chucks of the Constitution for interpretation, it yields supporters and 
critics. Ackerman’s interpretation of American constitutionalism is no exception. 
Ackerman’s critics have been particularly vocal and sharp with the publication of his We 
the People1 books.  As is the case with any such large enterprise, there is much to admire 
in Ackerman’s work but also a great deal skepticism with the yield of his efforts.
     Ackerman started out his legal career in an effort to grasp the economic impact of 
American laws. From a specialized niche in taxation, property law, and 
environmentalism, he has branched out into constitutional law issues, jurisprudence, and 
general philosophy. Therefore, in Ackerman’s efforts to encompass the whole of 
American constitutional development, it has generated a number of critical responses.
      Ackerman starts out from the familiar tripartite model of analyzing the major 
elements of American constitutionalism.  These three pillars of American 
constitutionalism are:  1) popular sovereignty, 2) federalism, and 3) individual rights.  
This work will focus on the first pillar of American constitutionalism.  It will be argued 
that Ackerman makes a serious mistake, in his analysis, in grounding his dualist 
1
 1BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (BELKNAP PRESS OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS
1991); 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (BELKNAP PRESS 1998).
3constitutionalism on a foundation of popular sovereignty. Dualism is defined by 
Ackerman to mean the process by which lawmaking takes place in the United States. He 
characterizes one mode of lawmaking as ordinary and the other as higher lawmaking. 
Ordinary lawmaking is the day to day lawmaking that politicians are elected to perform.  
Higher lawmaking occurs during exceptional periods of American history where ordinary 
citizens are directly thrust into the political arena in deciding the future course of the 
political system as a whole. His thesis of dualist constitutionalism centers around “We 
the People” delegating authority to the professional politicians to make law during 
normal periods, and the idea that citizens are willing to become more active participants 
in public affairs during extra-ordinary times.  He asserts that We the People must 
delegate day-to-day governmental activity to the elected officials, the professional 
politicians.  But, during periods of turmoil, crises, and other public stresses, the citizens 
are called upon to participate in the political process in a more direct way.
This brief reply could not adequately treat each and every major element in 
Ackerman’s book, We the People.  Hence, the major focus will be to critically analyze 
the first element in his thesis.  This element centers on his interpretation of what 
demarcates “constitutional moments” of change in American politics. A “constitutional 
moment” is defined as a major turning point in American politics as evidenced by a 
tectonic shift from what came before in the daily lives of people.  For example, the 
American Revolution was a constitutional moment because it resulted in a tectonic and 
structural shift in the politics and identity of the American people.  Another example is 
the Civil War, prior to the Civil War slavery was legal and tolerated in the United States. 
After the Civil War, it became illegal to have slaves.  The final example of a major 
4constitutional moment in American politics is the New Deal because it shifted away from 
giving primacy to local and state rules to a system where the Federal government takes 
on greater responsibility for the lives of citizens.
     Ackerman believes that the Supreme Court played an important role in codifying 
these tectonic shifts in American law.  But, is Ackerman correct in his analysis of the 
Supreme Court as codifier of the people’s will when the people have spoken on those rare 
constitutional moments?  Has the Supreme Court adequately listened to the People and 
codified what the People said?  This work will argue that such a simplistic schema is not 
an accurate representation of Supreme Court opinion surrounding each of Ackerman’s 
“constitutional moments.”  That Popular Sovereignty, as conceived in Ackerman’s We 
the People, is a flawed idea, and he makes a mistake to adopt it as a foundational matter 
in describing American political development. Popular sovereignty is the idea that what 
the people have to say in political affairs matters.  An appeal to the People may make for 
good advertising copy, but it plays a small role in American constitutional history.
The key question is:  Does Ackerman’s dualist democracy, in We the People, serve as 
an adequate description of representing the will of the American people?  This question 
will be broken down into two parts.  The first involves historiography, i.e., does his one-
Constitution/three-regime theory, as outlined in his “constitutional moments” of political 
change, fairly capture the will of the American people?  The second part asks:  Is 
Ackerman correct in casting the Supreme Court as the codifier and preserver of the 
People’s will during those “constitutional moments” when they have spoken? 
     Ackerman relies on the concept of popular sovereignty to vindicate his view of 
constitutionalism.  However, this foundation is a very shaky foundation, and Ackerman 
5does not give it adequate consideration.  This reply will show that Supreme Court case 
law does not support Ackerman’s democratization thesis.
Ackerman’s We the People project is a projected three-volume effort, with the first 
two volumes already published.  Although this work will focus on volume one, it will 
also borrow heavily from volume two.  We the People covers much ground, and an 
adequate analysis of all its parts would be difficult to treat within a single paper or book.  
But, before proceeding to a more specialized and limited treatment of We the People, an 
overall sense of Ackerman’s project will be provided. In his first volume Foundations, he
takes his theory of higher lawmaking and ordinary lawmaking and attempts to explain his 
dualist democracy. It serves as the foundation for his constitutional philosophy. He 
focuses on political foundations and tectonic shifts in political regimes from one 
generation to the next generation. The second volume Transitions takes the three major 
regime changes in American history and explains how this tripartite model can be of help 
in explaining American political and constitutional development.
     Ackerman has set himself the major task of re-conceptualizing American 
constitutional law.  He is bold in his challenge to both historian and theorist to re-think 
American constitutional politics.  As indicated above, the cornerstone of his enterprise is 
what he describes as the dualist democracy of the American system of government.  With 
this stroke, he challenges both parliamentarians and individual rights foundationalists to 
re-conceptualize American democracy. Parliamentarians are people who give priority to 
the legislative branch of government over the executive or judiciary. Individual rights 
foundationalists give priority to inherent or granted rights of individuals to shape their 
lives free from electoral politics.  Voting should not be sufficient grounds to negate
6inalienable rights that were granted by either a higher being or granted over generations 
as a matter of common law. Whereas parliamentarians would put everything to a vote,
individual rights people carve out a space from the democratic process that is sacred and 
immune to democratic politics. The tension between a carved out sphere of individual 
rights free from the democratic process and the ability of democratic institutions to 
subject all matters to a vote has been an ongoing debate for generations.
     Ackerman attempts to reconcile this tension between rights and democracy by giving 
democratic institutions a privileged position in altering rights that may be considered 
sacred by some. In this effort, he moves boldly and with sweeping breadth in this re-
conceptualization project.  He intends no less than to overturn more conventional 
understandings of American constitutionalism.  To do so, he breaks up American history 
into three major constitutional moments—the Framing of the Constitution, the Civil War, 
and the New Deal.  Each of these constitutional moments has come about by 
revolutionary2 upheaval and serves as a major marker for beginning any meaningful 
analysis of American constitutionalism.  These three major constitutional moments have 
brought forth vast changes in how Americans define themselves and interpret their 
history. 
     What is defined as the constitutional moment theory of historical change goes beyond 
the cut and dry positivist understanding of American constitutional law.  Ackerman 
means no less than to overturn the conventional understanding of constitutional change in 
2
 Ackerman uses the term “revolutionary” in a different sense than the French Revolution, Leninist, or 
Maoist types of revolution.  He believes that there can be such a thing as a liberal revolution.  As a liberal, 
he generally means upheaval that falls short of total revolution, but, nevertheless, can still be revolutionary 
in scope.   Ackerman has been influenced by Hannah Arendt’s work on this matter.  For an elaboration on 
his conception of revolution, see:  Bruce Ackerman, Revolution on a Human Scale, 108 YALE L.J. 2279 
(1999). 
7the United States.  Convention has it that the American people, through their 
representatives, are sworn to uphold the Constitution as it is written and changed via the 
formalist procedure set out in Article Five. That is, Article Five of the Constitution 
specifies all the legitimate ways that it could be altered. Ackerman believes this is not an 
accurate explanation of the American system of government.  In the place of such a 
formalist procedure, he attempts to substitute a more dynamic and dialectical explanation 
of constitutional change.  What lies at the heart of this enterprise is the Constitution is
seen as a “living” document that can be altered by a multitude of ways that go outside of 
Article Five procedures and thereby giving new life to the document.3
     In the process of explaining his theory of constitutional change, Ackerman 
commingles the liberal and republican traditions of political theory.  He attempts to 
bridge the Hartzian and Pocockian tradition via his dualist democratic theory.4  He cannot 
either fully endorse the Liberal/Hartzian tradition of American development with all the 
paraphernalia of American exceptionalism, or the Republican/Pocockian tradition with 
citizens breaking out of their selfish needs to help the Republic.  He aims to bridge this 
dual explanation of American development by acknowledging the strong liberal 
individualist streak in American politics without ignoring a tradition of civic virtue. 
3
 Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in 
Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221 (1995) (Tribe argues, in opposition to this 
proposition, that Article V is not as malleable as Ackerman would have us believe.  That in fact Article V 
does have teeth to it and cannot easily be discarded in the name of higher lawmaking.)
4 LOUIS HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA (A HARVEST/HBJ BOOK 1955); J.G.A. POCOCK, 
THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN 
TRADITION (PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS 1975).  For a critique of both neo-liberal and neo-republican 
approaches, see:  Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. 
REV. 523, 529 (1995).  For a further critique of the Hartzian model of American democracy, see:  NORMAN 
BIRNBAUM, THE RADICAL RENEWAL: THE POLITICS OF IDEAS IN MODERN AMERICA (PANTHEON BOOKS
1988).  Birnbaum says,  “Hartz’s view of the United States as a society whose central agreement was that it 
was a democracy of property owners, and Hofstadter’s pervasive skepticism about the extent to which 
democracy could dominate property (to which was added an even more pronounced skepticism about the 
bona fides and efficacy of many of the tribunes of democracy).” p. 60.
8Ackerman shifts back and forth between liberalism and republicanism as he weaves his 
tale of American development.  As Miriam and William Galston wrote, “On another 
level, We the People represents Ackerman’s effort to mediate between liberal democratic 
theorists and their civic republican critics.”5
     Further, Ackerman neither endorses a Wilsonian/Beardian progressive explanation of 
American constitutional development6, nor a more liberal laissez-faire explanation.7
Again, he is relying on his dualist democracy to bridge the gap between class/interest 
politics and unfettered privatization of national and natural resources.8  Yet, Ackerman is 
convinced that there is a discernable pattern to American development.  His 
constitutional moments theory encompasses an explanation for how political change is 
legitimated in the United States, and how the masses play a vital role in that legitimation 
process. 
     Ackerman does this by splitting up politics into “normal” and “higher” level.  By 
normal politics, he means the day-to-day legislation that governmental representatives are 
engaged in debating, blocking, or passing, about which the typical citizen knows nothing 
of what or whom such legislation will benefit or hurt.  Presumably the representatives are 
acting for the benefit of all citizens.  Whereas Ackerman characterizes higher level 
politics as those rare moments, three such moments thus far, according to Ackerman that 
brings the people into the political arena. Therefore, when the people speak on those rare 
5
 Miriam Galston & William A. Galston, Reason, Consent, and the U.S. Constitution:  Bruce Ackerman’s 
We the People, 104 ETHICS 447 (1994).
6 WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT (MERIDIAN BOOKS, INC. 1956);  CHARLES A. 
BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (THE FREE PRESS, 
1986).
7 WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, WHAT SOCIAL CLASSES OWE TO EACH OTHER (HARPER & BROTHERS 
PUBLISHING, 1920).
8
 William W. Fisher III, The Defects of Dualism, 59 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW 955, 964-974 
(1992).
9occasions, what they say should be taken seriously by the professional politicians and the 
courts.
     One key aspect of this “higher” level of politics is that citizens are brought directly 
into the political arena.  According to Ackerman, the citizens play a key role in the 
“debating” and “deliberation” phase of the constitutional moment.  Ackerman marks out 
four distinct stages in his constitutional moments theory of change:  1) political signaling, 
2) proposing, 3) public debate/deliberation, and 4) Supreme Court codification.9  All of 
these stages of major political transformation have been questioned by scholars, but stage 
three has received sustained critique.  For example, Nedelsky says:
What makes for a successful moment of constitutional politics? By Ackerman’s own arguments, it 
cannot be simply persuading enough people to accept the change you advocate; it requires getting 
them to ponder and deliberate the change with serious and sustained attention.  Ackerman tells us 
too little about what enables a people to do this, especially given the rather grim picture he paints of 
what people do during the long periods of normal politics.  What will enable them to reflect 
thoughtfully and effectively about basic shared political values, when for decades they have done 
little more than try to pursue their private interests?10
    Also, Ackerman casts the Supreme Court in a “preservationist” role.  That is, the Court 
serves to codify what the people said, and monitors the politicians during normal political 
periods to insure they do not exceed the people’s will.  Hence, the Supreme Court, in the 
Ackermanian worldview plays a vital role in preserving the will of the people, until the 
people speak again.  Ackerman sees the federalist role and separation of powers as vital 
in describing the American system of government.  He will counterpoise this federalist 
position to the parliamentarian or Wilsonian understanding—or as he calls the Wilsonian 
democrats:  “monistic” democrats.  The Wilsonian democrats give the legislature 
supremacy. That is, a Wilsonian is like a parliamentarian, a person that sees the benefits 
9 WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS, pp. 267-269; for a more detailed presentation of Ackerman’s four stage 
theory of constitutional change, see generally, WE THE PEOPLE:  TRANSFORMATIONS.
10
 Jennifer Nedelsky, The Puzzle and Demands of Modern Constitutionalism, 104 ETHICS 513 (1994).
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of giving primary authority to the legislative branch of government over the executive or 
the judiciary.
     The final major element in the Ackerman thesis involves his treatment of individual 
rights.  Here, Ackerman departs from his liberal position into a more civic understanding 
of individual rights.  He will not ground his thesis in a natural rights philosophy.  That is, 
he will not ground individual rights in a “higher power” or “being.”11  Nor will he fix 
rights as immutable once placed in the Constitution.  Hence, he objects to there being 
natural rights that could not be overturned by popular will if the people so chose to do so.  
He refers to those that protect rights first and democracy second as Rights 
Foundationalists.12
          According to Leuchtenberg, scholars have not been kind to Ackerman’s 
constitutional moments theory.
Scholars have dealt harshly with Bruce Ackerman’s audacious reconfiguration of American 
constitutional history.  Suzanna Sherry, who calls the Yale Law School professor “one of our best 
constitutionalist theorists,” nevertheless concludes that “Ackerman’s tale fails to inspire, because it 
is mired in a fictional past and envisions a utopian future” and because his “historical analysis is 
simplistic.”13
Now that the broad summary of Ackerman’s work in We the People has been stated, 
it will be examined in a more detailed way and sharpen the focus of what this paper aims 
to do and hopes to accomplish.
II. Constitutional Moments Historiography and Democracy’s Prospects
11
 Flaherty says, “For starters, Ackerman skimps on what Edward C. Corwin termed “the ‘[h]igher [l]aw’ 
[b]ackground of American Constitutional law.”  As a matter of theory, We the People has little patience for 
“natural law”—or “right reason”—as a source of constitutional rights or value.  [A]ny strategy for 
protecting rights outside constitutional politics can only be an ahistorical and essentially un-American 
import.  But virtues higher lawmaking may not be all the Federalists believe in.  As Bailyn pointed out a 
generation ago, American Whigs marched toward resolution with “the law of nature” as one of several 
arrows in their quiver.” (p. 588).
12 WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS, pp. 10-16.
13
 William E. Leuchtenburg, When the People Spoke, What Did They Say?: The Election of 1936 and the 
Ackerman Thesis, 108 YALE L. J. 2077 (1999).
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     Ackerman states that there were three constitutional moments in American history.  
The first was the American Revolution/Constitution; the second was the Civil 
War/Reconstruction, and the third was the Great Depression/New Deal.  According to 
Ackerman, these three major markers are the bedrock of American constitutional law as 
we know it today.  Should any or all of these upheavals not have occurred, we would 
have a vastly different constitutional system. 
     Ackerman’s historiography in depicting these demarcations is problematic.  Many 
historians are left uncomfortable with Ackerman’s leap into their domain. Ackerman 
claims that his historiography is anti-Burkean, yet one legal historian depicts his 
approach to be exactly that, Burkean.14  A Burkean is someone who believes in 
incremental change, is suspicious of abstract principles, and sees rule by the People as a 
troublesome concept.  This I will call Ackerman’s “historiographic problem.” 
     The second component of the problem deals with the claim that the Supreme Court 
has served as codifier of what the People have said during constitutional moments.  This 
work will show that Ackerman’s depiction of the Supreme Court as preserving the 
People’s will is seriously flawed and an inaccurate reflection of American 
constitutionalism. This I will call Ackerman’s “the Supreme Court as preserver problem.”
      As indicated earlier, Ackerman’s constitutional moments theory involves four stages:  
1) political signaling, 2) proposal, 3) public debate/deliberation, and 4) Supreme Court 
codification. Political signaling indicates the need for political change. The proposal 
stage is one whereby elected leaders spell out their plans to address the new political 
14
 Eben Moglen, The Incomplete Burkean: Bruce Ackerman’s Foundation for Constitutional History, 5 
YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 531 (1993).
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problem. The public debate and deliberation stage is the most critical because it demands 
that the public at large have an input in legitimizing the plans to resolve the changed 
circumstances of the nation. The final stage is basically a consolidation stage. It calls 
upon the Supreme Court to preserve the changes proposed and effectuated in the first 
three stages. The Court is asked to play this role because normal politics may dissipate 
the revolutionary gains made during the third stage. In order to secure the People’s 
judgment and will from being whittled away during normal politics, the Court is asked to 
insure that the politicians do not backslide to a pre-revolution stage once the 
revolutionary fervor ends. According to this theory, the Founding, Reconstruction, and 
New Deal meet all of these criteria.  Ackerman argues that these moments in American 
history are moments of regime change.  Hence, once the above listed criteria have been 
met, it indicates that “We the People” have spoken. 
     For Ackerman constitutional moments are periods of “constitutional politics” or 
higher level politics, during which ordinary citizens participate in the political arena.  
They have transformed themselves from private observers and selfish individuals to 
civic-minded, public-regarding citizens.  “Ackerman regards the concept of ‘private 
citizenship’ as being the foundational idea underlying dualism.  As the founders 
recognized, most citizens in the United States are private citizens, not public citizens or 
perfect privatists.”15
     With this level of involvement of the mass of citizenry, during constitutional 
moments, politicians and the judiciary cannot disregard or take lightly what “We the 
People” have said.  And for Ackerman, these constitutional moments are very rare in 
15
 Kent Greenwalt, Dualism and Its Status, 104 ETHICS 480 (1994); see also, Bruce A. Ackerman, Neo-
Federalism? in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY, Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad, eds. (CAMBRIDGE 
UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1988).  pp. 175-176.
13
American history.  Ackerman finds only three such major constitution/regime changing 
events, in the 200-plus year history of the United States.  During a return to normal 
politics, the professional politicians and judges must update their policies to reflect those 
changes that the People demanded.
     Many commentators and critics have dissected Ackerman’s work from numerous 
angles and perspectives.  This reply attempts to make a contribution to the ongoing 
political and constitutional debate by approaching Ackerman’s analysis of American 
constitutional politics from a rather unique angle.  Ackerman, along with most of his 
critics, approach American political and constitutional development with a presupposition 
that takes democracy for granted.  That is, democracy is assumed to be feasible even 
before any constitutional moments play themselves out.  Democracy is like air, we notice 
it when we are chocking for lack thereof.  Or democracy is like water.  It is all over the 
place and noticed when it’s gone, during moments of drought.  So it is taken for granted 
by both political scientists and constitutional law scholars, and democracy is taken as 
foundational for scholars beginning their inquiry into American politics. 
     This work will distinguish itself from the constitutional literature in that it will not 
presuppose such a democratic foundation.  What Ackerman and his critics take for 
granted in their analysis of American politics and constitutionalism will be questioned 
here.  That is, this work will not presuppose any possibility of the realization of 
democratic theory in the real world of American politics or in any other country’s politics 
for that matter. 
     The realization of democratic principles in real life, outside of the theoretical world, is 
hard to come by if not non-existent.  The usual defense of nations falling short of 
14
democratic principles, including the United States, has been that we have a democracy in 
its rudimentary form, in its primitive form, in an undeveloped state, but we are growing 
our democracy day and night.  That is, although democracy does not exist anywhere in 
the world in a perfect state, nevertheless, it is being home grown in many countries 
throughout the world, and each country has reached its own level of democratic growth.  
So the upshot of this is that some variation of democracy is worth striving for, even if 
perfect democracy cannot be established in the real world.  What Ackerman and his 
critics fail to notice is that democracy is a fictionalism, perhaps a useful fiction is some 
abstract sense, but nevertheless a fiction. This reply dispenses of any such hope, dream, 
or expectation of democracy’s growth.  The foundation of this work, unlike Ackerman 
and his critics, does not presuppose the possibility of a democratic foundation, and the 
concept democracy is taken to be a basically metaphysical concept.16
     Historically, the notions of democracy and popular sovereignty have not fared very 
well. Even Lincoln’s “great antagonist” could have endorsed a notion of popular 
sovereignty akin to Ackerman’s idea.
Ackerman’s near-neglect of this possibility reflects the remarkable resemblance between his 
position and that of Lincoln’s great antagonist, Stephen Douglas.  It was Douglas, after all, who 
affirmed the principle of “Popular Sovereignty”:  As long as the inhabitants of the territories 
conformed to the relevant procedural norms, they were perfectly free to decide whether to enter the 
16
 For convenience’s sake, not every use of the word “democracy” will be placed in quotations.  Here the 
concept is being used either to conform to common rhetoric of its existence or to describe Ackerman or his 
critics.  Although his critics are evaluating Ackerman’s work, they are, nevertheless, working within the 
same framework or paradigm as he is.  Hence, it should in no way be inferred that this paper will either 
accept or rely on any democratic principles that inform the work of other scholars or theorists. For a 
detailed critique of democracy, see:  EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY:  
SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM & THE PROBLEM OF VALUE (THE UNIVERSITY PRESS OF KENTUCKY 1973). Purcell 
says, “In Public Opinion Lippmann had retained some hope for a chastened, elite-controlled democracy, 
but he abandoned even that during the next three years.  The Phantom Public, which he published in 1925, 
revealed an almost complete despair about the possibility of democratic government.  His last hope was 
that people could be taught simply not to meddle in public affairs.  If that were possible, private interests 
could somehow make the governmental process work.  The public did not and could not govern.” (p. 106).  
Further, Purcell goes on to say, “By the end of the twenties many students of government had come to 
reject what they considered the romantic idea that all men should actively engage in governing the country, 
assuming the irrationality of most men and the practical impossibility of actual popular control.” (p. 108).
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union as free or slave states, and there were no deeper constitutional principles inclined one way or 
the other.  And while the event is unlikely in the extreme, Ackerman’s dualist democracy similarly 
offers no principled arguments against a suitably mobilized majority of the people that chose to 
institute slavery.
     It is pertinent to recall the grounds on which Lincoln opposed Popular Sovereignty, so 
understood.  His thesis was that the collective right of the people to rule themselves, the right to 
begin the Constitution with “We the People,” rests on a foundation of equal rights for individuals.17
     Beyond the Lincoln-Douglas debates, the concept of popular sovereignty has not fared 
well.18  Whether the concept of popular sovereignty is equivalent to the concept of 
democracy is hard to say.  But, regardless, of the degree of equivalence, they have not 
fared well as explanatory tools of American constitutional politics.  In particular, the 
notion of democracy has not done well either in its 2000-plus years of historical journey 
from Greece; nor has it fared well in its modern reincarnation, since the French 
Revolution.  Outside of rhetoric or high theory, one would be hard pressed during 
democracy’s 200-year revival to find nations, countries, and states that have lived up 
either to its rhetoric or high-theory expectations.  Consequently, those scholars or 
theorists that accept and incorporate such a theory in their investigations, analyses, or 
reviews have a very heavy burden to carry in explaining why they are incorporating such 
a theory into their work.    
     Accordingly, this work will argue that Ackerman’s dualist democratic principles are 
problematic, because he implicitly and explicitly adopts a democratic foundation for his 
17
 Galston  & Galston, p. 457.
18
 “The sovereignty of the people is a key element of American constitutionalism.  [T]he ratification of the 
Constitution through constitutional conventions enabled the founding generation to implement the abstract 
idea that only the people could adopt a fundamental law.  Yet the doctrine of popular sovereignty has never 
had an entirely clear meaning in the American constitutional tradition.  [M]ost colonists accepted the idea, 
conventional in the political theory of the time, that there must be a supreme, indivisible, final, and absolute 
power in every government.  [I]n the debate over ratification of the Constitution, the Federalists gave new 
emphasis to the idea of popular sovereignty.  Neither state government nor the new federal government was 
to be sovereign. Instead, the American people as a whole were the true sovereign, parceling out authority to 
the different levels and branches of government.” STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: 
FROM THEORY TO POLITICS (PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS 1996). pp 19-20.
16
constitutional analysis.  Ackerman knows very well from his reading of the Constitution 
and of the disposition of the Framers of this document that they neither endorsed 
democracy nor incorporated democratic principles into the Constitution.  Hence, 
Ackerman has a very heavy burden of proof to bear in finding the rudimentary elements 
of democratic principles underpinning the Constitution or in explaining how those who 
drafted the Constitution, being non-democrats to the last man, could have somehow 
inculcated any democratic principles into the document that they were drafting.  
Ackerman has no difficulty accepting, and gladly accepting, such a challenge because a 
close analysis of his book, We the People, indicates that he is well aware that the original 
Constitution and its Founders were not democrats.  But, this will not deter Ackerman in 
establishing the democratic bona fides of the Constitution retroactively.  That is, although 
the Constitution did not start its life as a democratic document, it was subsequently 
transformed into a democratic document via the blood that was spilled to make certain 
fundamental amendments stick to it.  Hence, the whole Constitution has experienced a 
rebirth every time the People stood up and demanded changes.
There are formidable problems of determining that “we the people” were the authors of any major 
political change in the United States—from the elite gathering of the constitutional convention in 
1787 to the embrace of the regulatory state by much of the corporate elite in the New Deal era.  I 
have come close to arguing that the Constitution of 1787 was designed to make it practically 
impossible for “we the people” ever to form and give effect to their considered political judgment.19
     Built into Ackerman’s conception of American development is American 
exceptionalism, with a wink and nod to Hartz and to the Whig tradition of casting 
American democracy as a march for progress, liberty, and apple pie.  That is, Ackerman 
19
 Nedelsky, p. 503.
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sees American democracy as one of the strongest and one of the healthiest democracies 
ever known on this planet.
     Ackerman is fully aware of historical arguments that suggest the difficulties in the 
formation and maintenance of democracies.  He addresses some of the historical or 
theoretical concerns of democracy by distinguishing his dualist democracy from its 
Wilsonian and direct democracy cousins.  But if democracy is not a viable or possible 
model, then whether it is dualist, unitarian, direct, or what have you, it is simply a very 
serious error to build such a model in describing the American system of government.  It 
not only does not accurately reflect the current American situation, but it also risks 
distorting American historical development.  This work will have none of such 
presuppositions. 
     Ackerman is jubilant and at times celebratory of the progression of American 
democracy.  He sprinkles his rhetoric, in We the People, with nothing less than God 
smiling down on American democracy, with the Deity justly rewarding the American 
people with its blessings.  So Ackerman’s jubilation and overflow of patriotic fervor 
underlies much ground that he covers, only to pile qualification upon qualification, as the 
good lawyer that he is, to make sure that his enthusiasm and jubilation do not overtake 
his cautious lawyerly approach to writing constitutional history.
     Ackerman aims at no less than rehabilitating the “People” in casting them front and 
center of American political development.  For Ackerman, the People are the source and 
foundation and necessary energy to legitimize constitutional regimes and regime change 
during those critical moments that serve as markers to subsequent changes in 
constitutional law.  “Still there are very grave problems with trying to legitimate the U.S. 
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government via popular consent.  For at least two-thirds of American history, the 
majority of the adult population was legally ineligible to vote.”20   “Whereas Bickel 
rejects “the People” and popular sovereignty as abstractions, Ackerman wants to imbue 
those concepts with meaning.”21  Without the People serving this important role, 
Ackerman would become very dismayed at the prospects of developing and nurturing 
American democracy.
     Unfortunately, Ackerman’s belief in the People appears to be a very vague, almost a 
mystical belief—that they can be counted on to help bolster and define American 
prospects.  Not only does Ackerman use the notion of the People as a trump card, but, he 
makes it easy for the People to exist in Ackerman’s dualist democracy.  The main 
function of the People in Ackerman’s democracy is played out during stage three of his 
constitutional moments theory of regime change, the stage that involves public debate 
and deliberation on the part of the People to bring forth and help in the legitimation of the 
new regime.  After the People have spoken, they can go back to sleep, so to speak, for the 
next 60 or so years—until they are required to awaken from their slumber for the next 
regime change. 
     Ackerman has a very good reason to assign the People this vital role.  He recognizes, 
as well as many other empirical social scientists, that the People have fallen asleep during 
periods of normal politics.  So if Ackerman is to salvage the role of the People in a 
democracy, he needs to make sure they are definite participants in the system, but on only 
very few occasions.  The rest of the time, if the people manage to get themselves to the 
20
 Roger M. Smith, Legitimating Reconstruction: The Limits of Legalism, 108 YALE L. J. 2039, 2055 
(1999).
21
 Laura Kalman, Law, Politics, and the New Deal(s), 108 YALE L. J. 2165, 2208 (1999); see generally, 
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS,
2nd ed., (YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS 1986).
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polls and pull the lever once a year or perhaps every couple of years, the People have 
fulfilled their citizen role. 
     Ackerman sees no other way to inject ordinary citizens into the “normal” political 
debate on a continuous basis.  As a follower of The Federalist and practical and shrewd 
reader of poll returns, he realizes his dualist democracy needs to make the People vital, 
yet also needs to explain their lack of participation and interest in day-to-day politics.
III. A Critical Analysis of the Underpinning of Ackerman’s Constitutional
Democracy
The gist of this brief reply to Ackerman should suggest that Ackerman’s appeals to the 
People is nothing more than a smoke screen used to obscure the true objectives 
underlying various ideologies, ideas, and dreams that require wide support.22  Political 
scientists have not been kind to the idea of the People, especially since World War II, as 
the various behavioral models suggest that there are many people out there, but not a 
single entity encompassing the People as a whole. 
22
 Another scholar that is troubled by Ackerman’s appropriation of the phrase “We the People” is Randy 
Barnett.  Barnett is skeptical of the unity such a phrase implies in the granting of consent or legitimacy to 
the proposed courses of action by the professional politicians, in the name “We the People.”  Barnett says:  
“[I] will show that “We the People” is a fiction.  I will demonstrate that constitutional legitimacy has not 
been conferred by either the individual or collective consent of  We the People.  [T]hough genuine consent, 
were it to exist, could give rise to a duty of obedience, the conditions necessary for We the People actually 
to consent to anything like the Constitution or amendments thereto have never existed and could never 
exist.”  Randy E. Barnett, Constitutional Legitimacy, BOSTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, (Working 
Paper Series, Public Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 01-19). p. 8.
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     Pluralist political scientists, such as Robert Dahl, were able to capitalize on this insight 
in the 1950s by breaking up democracy into various interests groups.23  Interest groups 
competing for resources, collectively take on the role of the People.  Hence, democracy 
was redefined from the People speaking to the various interests groups speaking in their 
competition with one another for scarce resources through votes and dollars.  This is a 
more utilitarian and practical form of democracy than the lofty “We the People” 
version.24
     Nevertheless, this does not deter Ackerman from serving as a cheerleader for 
American exceptionalism and his faith in “We the People.”   Even though Ackerman 
splits citizens into three groupings—public citizen, private citizen, and perfect privatist—
it is not clear what he is trying to accomplish with such a division.25  Presumably, during 
constitutional moments, most citizens regardless of their classification during normal 
politics will become engaged and participate. 
     Ackerman appears to have an overly psychological explanation for participation in 
politics.  It basically centers on the self-interest or selfish nature of our species.  Whereas 
the People go about their day-to-day business during the normal political season, they 
23 ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS 1989); DILEMMAS OF 
PLURALIST DEMOCRACY: AUTONOMY VS. CONTROL (YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS 1982); A PREFACE TO 
DEMOCRATIC THEORY (THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS 1956).
24 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (HARPER TORCHBOOKS 1976).  
Schumpeter’s procedural version of democracy marked a whole generation of post-World War II political 
scientists that became disillusioned over the prospects of an earlier more substantive and more progressive 
version of democracy.  Ido Oren, How America’s Foreign Policy Affects Its Political Science, THE 
CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, sect. II, September 6, 2002, p.   Oren says,   “Progressive definitions 
of ‘democracy’ that had been common in the 1930s met a similar fate.  During the Great Depression 
political scientists often defined democracy as much in economic as in political terms and as much in terms 
of substantive ideals as in terms of electoral process.  [R]obert A. Dahl of Yale mounted a lucid defense of 
democratic socialism in his doctoral dissertation in 1940.  Merriam defined democracy partly in terms of 
ideals such as ‘the perfectibility of mankind’ and fair distribution of economic gains throughout society. 
But, in the 1950s, political scientists concluded that faith in human ‘perfectibility’ was a pathology 
associated with ‘totalitarian’ regimes, and they abandoned substantive visions of democracy in favor of 
procedural definitions inspired by the work of Joseph A. Schumpeter.”  (p. B13).
25 WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS, pp. 230-235.
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seem to be forced into the political arena with focused attention to the goings on of public 
life during disasters, upheavals, famines, etc.  So, Ackerman basically has a captive 
audience, whether they like it or not, during turbulent times.  Whether this shock therapy 
or forced labor in the public domain properly squares with the People’s choices is another 
matter.  But Ackerman is able to claim, with some plausibility, that crises generate 
intense public interest in the issues and policies of the day. 
     However, if democracy is defined by voluntary participation in the political arena, 
then Ackerman’s schematic is problematic because he catches his audience in a forced 
way during periods of upheaval.  Regardless of whether the masses become mobilized 
under such immediate threat to their personal, economic, or land interests, it would seem 
to suggest that such moments are the worst period to consult the People, because they are 
less lucid and in a panic and are more likely to operate as a mob rather than calm citizens 
weighing their political options.26  That is, Ackerman defines his constitutional moments 
as critical to his definition of a dualist democracy, but it seems that turbulent periods 
would be the worst time to consult the people, since the People are reacting under 
emergency conditions and are liable to over-react and take matters into their own hands.  
And if history is any guide, the People will mobilize themselves into deadly mobs and 
will threaten life or property of those they perceive as their enemy. 
     Yet Ackerman singles out such a period in his constitutional moments schematic to 
invite the People into the public debate.  This seems to me to be a shortsighted and 
erroneous analysis of crises situations.  Yet, Ackerman would have us believe that the 
26
 Terrence Sandalow, Abstract Democracy:  A Review of Ackerman’s WE THE PEOPLE, 9 CONSTITUTIONAL 
COMMENTARY 309 (1992).  “Crises do sometimes bring out the best in us, but at times they seem to do the 
opposite.  It is, therefore, hardly self-evident that the increased popular attention to politics during such 
periods is especially likely to produce public-spirited deliberation.” (p. 327)
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People are in their most creative mode during such periods.  One would assume that such 
periods should be treated as aberrations, and more thoughtful and creative solutions come 
about during less stressful and peaceful times.  But, Ackerman would have none of it.
     At bottom, although Ackerman would not directly admit it, he supports judicial 
supremacy in the day-to-day monitoring of normal politics.  The Supreme Court’s 
preservationist role becomes critical to ensuring that the professional politicians do not 
exceed the parameters set out by the People.  Hence, indirectly, Ackerman has set up the 
Supreme Court as the ultimate authority and interpreter of the People’s will during 
normal periods.  Unlike the Progressive monists, such as Wilson, that give priority and 
supremacy to the legislative branch, Ackerman opts out for a federalist system where the 
Supreme Court serves as the ultimate interpreter and codifier of the People’s will. 
     To what degree this undermines his faith in democratic principles is unclear.  
Although the People may speak in amorphous terms, it is the responsibility of the 
Supreme Court to decipher what they said and to codify it.  It is a rather dubious 
proposition that the Court can maintain such a role. A brief review of Supreme Court 
opinions will show that the Court has not carried out its preservationist role, as Ackerman 
would have us believe. 
     The history of the Supreme Court is mostly one of neglect with regard to what the 
People have to say.  But it is puzzling why a well-educated man such as Ackerman would 
place such ultimate faith in the Supreme Court.  He is fully aware that the Supreme Court 
has been ahead of the People in a few cases in American history—and dragged its feet on 
popular demands in other cases.  Yet, the Court could hardly be characterized as the 
People’s preservation institute.  Of course, here Ackerman neglects the fact that most 
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judgeships below the Supreme Court level are elected judgeships in the United States, 
with all that elections entail in terms of fundraising, politicking, campaigning, promising, 
and executing the partisan will of their supporters.27  Nevertheless, Ackerman feels 
comfortable in casting the Supreme Court as the ultimate guardian of the People’s will.28
     As indicated earlier, Ackerman characterizes American constitutional history as one 
Constitution/three regimes.  He marks the first regime from the endorsement of the 
original Constitution until the Civil War, the second regime (also referred to as the 
Middle Republic) from the Civil War to the New Deal, and the third regime from the 
New Deal to the present.  Ackerman takes the Civil War Amendments and the New Deal 
actions as markers for the emplacement of the new regimes.  But unlike Justice Black, 
who saw the Civil War Amendments as incorporating the original Bill of Rights,29 sort of 
nationalizing the Bill of Rights, Ackerman is convinced that the Civil War Amendments 
and the New Deal changes amounted to giving birth to new regimes, vastly different from 
the previous ones, yet not wholly discarding what came earlier.
     Yet, those doctrinalists that uphold the restoration thesis take issue with Ackerman 
over the New Deal as a new regime.  Rather they view the situation as one of restoration, 
believing that the Court of the Middle Republic, as evidenced by the Lochnerism of the 
period, exceeded its authority in overstepping the boundaries of the other branches of 
government and meddling with political and economic questions and issues.30
27
 Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty:  Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 689 (1995).
28 WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS, p. 10.
29The Bill of Rights was intended to apply only to the Federal government, not to the States.  Justice Black 
among others claims that the Reconstruction Amendments nationalized the Bill of Rights.  That is, it has 
become applicable against the States as well as the federal government. 
30 WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS, chap. 9.
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     According to the “restoration thesis,” the election of 1936, instead of bringing forth a 
new constitutional regime, was simply putting the Court back in its proper place.  That is, 
the Court was to leave the political questions to the other branches of government and 
simply stick to interpreting the law.  And the election of 1936 forced the justices to 
restore its traditional role by overturning their Lochnerian philosophy of reading a 
particular economics into their decisions.  That is, the restoration theorists believe the 
Court has restoring it proper role in the federalist system by leaving economic and 
political questions to the other bodies.  Hence, it was believed that the Court exceed its 
authority during the previous 50 years, and the election returns of 1936 strongly indicated 
that the Court best retreat and to leave economic decisions to the political bodies and not 
go beyond those economic/property protections clearly stated in the text of the 
Constitution.  “This is nowhere better illustrated than by the reaction of some leading 
Harvard doctrinalists to Ackerman’s criticism of restorationism.  The response of Charles 
Fried and Laurence Tribe contain more than a whiff of the idea that the post-1937 Court 
was returning to the path laid down by Chief Justice Marshall.”31
     Ackerman, however, will not have any of this restoration thesis.32  He attempts in his 
work to refute any suggestion that the Court has simply backtracking to a previous 
31
 Stephen M. Griffin, Constitutional Theory Transformed, 108 YALE L. J. 2115, 2123 (1999).
32
 “Within the familiar story line, the Supreme Court’s defense of private property during the early 
twentieth century was a historical aberration, based on little more than the judicial will to power.  In 
building up a structure of laissez-faire constitutionalism, the justices of the Lochner era strayed from the 
ancient truths elaborated by the Marshall Court.  Once this point is recognized, Franklin Roosevelt enters 
the story as an avenging angel of legal tradition—forcing the justices to return to an older and sounder 
version of the Constitution.” Bruce Ackerman, Rooted Cosmopolitanism, 104 ETHICS 516, 523 (1994). For 
more on this debate between the “constitutional moments” theorists and the restoration theorists, see: 
Michael W. McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment, 11 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY 115 
(1994). pp. 117-12.  McConnell says, “This challenges the constitutional view of New Deal 
constitutionalism, which rested not on a return to what Justice Hugo Black—a quintessential New Dealer—
said was ‘the original constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and economic 
beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws.’” (p. 118)  “Constitutional 
moment theorists, by contrast, tell us that the substance of the Constitution was transformed—not just that 
25
position.  His dialectical historiography suggests rather than retreating, the Court has 
been forced to move forward.  That is, most doctrinalists take the Middle Republic 
opinions to be an aberration.  But, Ackerman suggests nothing of the kind.  Rather, he 
maintains that those opinions were proper, and the Court was simply reflecting the state-
centered,33 Social Darwinian thrust of the time of the Middle Republic.  There was 
nothing aberrational about it.  So according to Ackerman, the Court was forced to make 
progress after 1936 rather than retreat to an earlier period.  
Similarly, Ackerman does not accept any explanation that smacks of the “grasp of 
war”34 theory in explaining the inclusion of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution.  He 
does not believe that the Republicans had a mandate, or a right, to exclude the Southern 
Democrats in passing the 14th Amendment, under a “grasp of war” theory, because 
Lincoln maintained all along that the South never had left the Union.  Hence, claims 
Ackerman, the Southern states were illegitimately excluded from voting on the 14th
Amendment, because under Lincoln's theory the South never left the Union, and they 
could return to their proper place within the Union upon the termination of hostilities.  
So, Ackerman does not buy the explanation that the Republicans were properly excluding 
rebel states because they were defeated and terms were dictated to them before they could 
mistaken interpretations were corrected or that the balance of power between legislative and judicial 
branches was righted.” (p. 119).
33
 State-centered government being one in which the Federal government did not have the level of control 
over the local economy during the Middle Republic period.  The Federal government played a smaller role 
vis-à-vis the state governments.  It was a period where states held more power in controlling their economy 
than after the federalizing of the economy post-New Deal.
34
 The “gasp of war” theory suggests that Lincoln was wrong in suggesting that the Southern states 
formally left the Union.  Although they seceded it was not a lawful exit, as rebellion states, once they laid 
down their arms, they were back to their original and lawful place in the Union.  So they had a 
constitutional right to vote on the Reconstruction amendments because they ceased their hostilities.  
Historians have found such an explanation hard to believe.  The “gasp of war” thesis holds that once the 
Southern states left the Union and took up arms against the Union, they became enemy combatants, not 
simply a minor breach but a break in the Union.  So upon their surrender, they were in no position to dictate 
terms.  In this “gasp of war” scenario, Lincoln was wrong.  These states had to follow the orders of the 
Union if they expected to be taken back into the Union as full participants.
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be allowed to rejoin the Union.  Since the South made it clear that they would not vote 
for the 14th Amendment, they could properly be excluded as long as they failed to meet 
the terms and conditions set for defeated combatants.35
     What appears to be emerging is not simply a semantics debate as to the proper reading 
of historical documents, but the various interpretations based on ideological debates. 
With each group attempting to find a particular reading of historical events that supports 
their theory of constitutional evolution in the United States. Some have argued that 
Ackerman’s one Constitution/three regime theory of American government is either 
under-inclusive or over-inclusive.36  Some of Ackerman’s critics would include the Age 
of Jackson, the dismantling of Reconstruction period from the 1870s to 1900s, the Civil 
Rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s,  and the Feminist Movement of the 1970s.37
At this point, we can begin to see the costly ways in which Ackerman’s framework for legitimating 
the American regime minimizes moral substance.  According to his telescoped but accurate 
retelling, the Jacksonian era was a thirty-year period when the nation through popular elections 
frequently endorsed, and the courts consolidated, a vision of the United States as a state-centered, 
racist white “democracy” in ways that went far beyond the settled constitutional understandings of 
the Founding era.38
      Further, Ackerman claims that lawyers, judges, and scholars that see a smooth 
transition from the Civil War and the New Deal are making a serious mistake in their 
35 WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS, see, Part Two:  Reconstruction.
36 G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL (HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS 2000).  
“Ultimately Ackerman lets his normative and schematic goals overwhelm his historical narrative. The 
result is an ingenious but over-determined portrait of constitutional jurisprudence at the time of the New 
Deal, and a remarkably sparse and derivative portrait of the years that preceded Ackerman’s transformative 
moment in the 1930s.” (p. 27).
37
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L. REV. 845 (1996); Larry Kramer, What’s a Constitution for Anyway? Of History and Theory, Bruce 
Ackerman and the New Deal, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 885 (1996); both articles attempting to see whether 
the Lopez case signals Ackermanian constitutional change within the Newt Gingrich revolution; United 
States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995); other scholars would add the dismantling of Reconstruction and 
the election of 1800 as constitutional moments, see respectively: Michael W. McConnell, The Forgotten 
Constitutional Moment, 11 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY 115 (1994); Joanne B. Freeman, The Election 
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analysis of American constitutional history.  “Throughout, Ackerman stresses the 
radicalism, the ‘unconventionality’ of Republican Reconstruction.  It is central to his 
thesis that Reconstruction worked a ‘transformative’ change—another term that appears 
consistently in his text.39  For Ackerman, the essence of transformation was what he calls 
a ‘re- founding’ of the United States—the replacement of the incompletely nationalized 
polity established in 1788 with a fully nationalized polity.”40  He neither accepts the 
grasp of war explanation with regard to the passing of the Reconstruction Amendments 
nor the restoration thesis in explaining the Court’s overstepping into the domains of the 
other branches of government.  And, the election of 1936 forced the Court to return to the 
Marshall principle of not entangling the Court in political questions.
     So the transformation of the American republic was nationalized and democratized via 
the passage of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution and the election of 1936.  The 
procedures used were outside the formalities of the Constitution itself.  Nevertheless, the 
document needed updating and change had to be made by going outside the 
Constitution’s parameters in order to effect change to the Constitution’s internal organs.
IV. The Supreme Court in the Middle Republic and its Aftermath
The Supreme Court has not served the role well, as the People’s preservation institute
during the Middle Republic. Contrary to Ackerman’s thesis, the Court did not incorporate 
the People’s will in the aftermath of the Civil War or New Deal. The Civil War and New 
39 See generally, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS.
40
 Michael Les Benedict, Constitutional History and Constitutional Theory:  Reflections on Ackerman, 
Reconstruction, and the Transformation of the American Constitution, 108 YALE L. J. 2011, 2028-2029 
(1999).
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Deal were major events, but the Supreme Court failed to serve as the People’s codifier. 
Prior to the Civil War, the Supreme Court supported the institution of slavery with its 
opinion in  Dred Scott v. Sanford,41 which was overturned by the 13th Amendment, but 
the Supreme Court did not take the 14th Amendment as a fundamental break in American 
constitutional law.  Cases such as the Civil Rights Cases42 and Plessy v. Ferguson43
continued the segregation and exclusion of blacks even though they gained their 
freedom.44
     Although big changes were underway during the late 19th century with regard to the 
power of private property via the explosion of corporate America, the Supreme Court was 
not more inclined to break with the past as Ackerman would have us believe.  The 
Lochnerian45 bent and Social Darwinian thrust of the turn of the century jurisprudence 
does not sit well with democratic principles.  But, regardless, of the type of economic 
philosophy a particular Court may be imbued, the granting of popular consent becomes 
41
 19 Howard 393 (1857) (The Court held that a Negro slave was not a “citizen” of the United States and 
hence could not claim rights and privileges afforded to citizens.)
42
 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (The Fourteenth Amendment does not inhibit private citizens from discriminating with 
regard to hotel, theater, or railroad accommodations to blacks.)
43
 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (The Court promulgated the doctrine of “separate but equal” as sufficient in the 
treatment of black citizens.)
44 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT (OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 1993).  
“Sumner’s bill reached the statute books as the Civil Rights Act of 1875.  It contained a prohibition against 
racial discrimination in inns, public conveyances, and places of amusement.  The prohibition was, however, 
ruled invalid by the Wait Court in 1883 Civil Rights Cases on the ground that it sought to reach 
discriminatory action that was purely private in nature and consequently not within the scope of the Equal 
Protection Clause.” (p. 166).  Freedom of contract doctrine clashed with the rights of people to engage in 
private enterprise without being found to have trespassed on the rights of minorities.  “It was Justice 
Peckham who spoke for the majority in the important freedom of contract cases decided by the Fuller 
Court.  In particular, he wrote the landmark opinion in Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1897), where freedom of 
contract was established as an essential element of the ‘liberty’ protected by due process.” (p. 180). “Chief 
Justice Fuller’s biography does not even mention the 1896 case of Plessy v. Ferguson.  Yet the decision 
there is now one of the most criticized decisions of the Fuller Court.  [W]hile the Fuller Court developed 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause as the principal safeguard of property rights, its Plessy 
decision ensured that the amendment was of little value to the blacks for whose benefit it had primarily 
been adopted.” (p. 188).
45 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (The Court upheld the freedom of contract doctrine, that the 
State had no business interfering in privately agreed to contracts.)
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an illusive enterprise.  Barnett put it bluntly, “[t]he conditions necessary for We the 
People actually to consent to anything like the Constitution or amendments thereto have 
never existed and could never exist.”46
     Ackerman’s thesis becomes even weaker with regard to his claim of the effects of 
post-New Deal constitutionalism, since no new constitutional amendments were 
formalized as a consequence of the Great Depression, as was the case with the Civil War.  
Clearly, the Supreme Court thwarted some business regulation demanded by Roosevelt. 
Ackerman claims that the People have spoken, and the Roosevelt Administration 
responded to the People’s pleas for help by forcing the Court to change direction. 
Although there appears to be some truth to this proposition, the reality of the situation 
may not be a matter of simple causality. 
     The Court early in the New Deal was favorably inclined towards Roosevelt’s policies 
in such cases as Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell47 and Nebbia v. New 
York48show.  But, the Court shifted away from the proposed legislation of businesses in 
the case of United States v. Butler,49 as a marker thwarting New Deal legislation.  And, 
the Court was finally pushed to be more accommodating to the New Deal initiatives to 
get a hold of the economy as indicated by cases such as West Coast Company v. 
46
 Randy E. Barnett, Constitutional Legitimacy, BOSTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW (Working Paper 
Series, Public Law & Legal Theory, Working Papers No. 01-19). p. 8.
47
 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (The Court found that the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law was not a violation 
of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment nor did it impair the 
Contracts clause of the Constitution.)
48
 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (The State does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in 
fixing minimum and maximum prices for milk.)
49
 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (The Court held that the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 was unconstitutional 
because it violated state’s rights in attempting to regulate the control of agricultural production.)
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Parrish,50 National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,51 United 
States v. Darby Lumber Company,52 Wickard v. Filburn,53 and Ferguson v. Skrupa,54 as 
the aftermath of the New Deal shakeup and the so-called switch-in-time that saved nine.55
     But, it is not clear that Ackerman is correct in characterizing this shakeup as giving 
birth to a new regime—as a major break in American constitutional law outside of greater 
control and interest in business legislation.  It is also not clear whether this was so radical
of a break as to consider it a new regime.  The Supreme Court continued to adhere to the 
separation of powers.  And, although the office of the presidency, under the leadership of 
President Roosevelt, has gained in stature, the presidency continued to be boxed in by 
cases such as Youngstown Sheet & Tube Corp v. Sawyer56 and United States v. Nixon.57
So, it is clear the Supreme Court toned down its opposition to the legislative control of 
business due to the disaster of the Great Depression.  As indicated above, the president 
50
 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (The Court held that a Washington state laws that prohibited wages below a living 
wage and conditions of labor detrimental to the health and morals of women and children were not contrary 
to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.)
51
 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (The Court held that under the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 that the National 
Labor Relations Board was able to regulate a corporation that engaged in unfair labor practices.)
52
 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (The Court held that Congress may regulate interstate commerce, where the 
employer fell below the prescribed minimum wage or prescribed maximum hours without paying overtime, 
was within the scope of the Commerce Clause in insuring that substandard products did not enter the 
stream of commerce.)
53
 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (The Court upheld Congress’s power to regulate wheat production and consumption 
that is not destined for interstate commerce but solely consumed within the state in accordance to the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act.)
54
 372 U.S. 726 (1963) (If the state passes legislation limiting the debt adjusting business to legal 
professionals, then it is not the business of the Court to insert its own opinion on that matter, according to 
Justice Black who wrote the opinion of the Court.)
55
 The “switch-in-time” refers to Justice Roberts switching his vote in support of New Deal legislation.  
With Justice Robert’s switch, a majority could begin endorsing Roosevelt’s regulatory programs.  If there 
was not this switch-in-time, Roosevelt was willing to consider packing the Court by putting additional 
members on the Court who saw the need for greater governmental control of business.
56
 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (The Court found that President Truman’s attempt to seize the steel mills in order to 
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 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (The Court held that President Nixon could not withhold certain information from 
the court under the theory of executive privilege.)
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could not take over a business in time of need or emergency, and claims to presidential 
privilege fell on deaf ears. 
     Hence, although the office of the 20th century presidency gained greater stature than 
the 19th century office of the presidency due to the leadership efforts of Roosevelt, it 
should not be characterized as a major break or a structural change in constitutional 
history.  Lincoln held considerable power during the Civil War.  And, emergency 
situations do thrust executives into the limelight.  But, this is merely due to the nature of 
the office, rather than some planned manifest destiny towards greater democratization.
With the fractional and in fighting of Congress, Presidents are given greater leeway to 
show leadership under crises conditions. Congress is not designed to act in such 
emergencies because decision by committee is a long drawn out process. In many other 
areas of law, it was business as usual.  Or, the natural changes that come from the 
retirement or exit of Justices.  Hence, it seems that Ackerman overplayed his hand in his 
characterization of American constitutional history as one-Constitution/three-regimes.
As Ackerman explains the New Deal, the reader too often sees the author’s hand manipulating the 
story.  Historical actors become oddly prescient.  The justices of the Hughes Court, for example, are 
portrayed as if they were conscious Ackermanian theorists, merely seeking to prod Franklin 
Roosevelt to clarify his electoral mandate with the votes of the New Deal legislation.  The book is 
also filled with “alternative histories” that imagine the causes of constitutional history if critical 
events had gone differently.58
The New Deal model of constitutional change effectively undermines a central element of 
constitutionalism, its commitment to formality.  Constitutionalism requires adhering to legal forms 
rather than directly pursuing a given goal, whether those forms require respecting the boundaries of 
the separation of powers, the technicalities of a fair trial, or the categories of the rule of law.  By 
contrast, Ackerman is most impressed with FDR’s pragmatism, his willingness to make use of any 
means to accomplish his goals.59
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59 Ibid, p. 410.
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     As indicated above, the Supreme Court opinions after the Civil War and New Deal do 
not support Ackerman’s foundational break with the past to sufficiently sustain his thesis 
of one-Constitution/three-regimes.  If Ackerman’s thesis is correct, then the Supreme 
Court should take decisive steps in the aftermath of the Civil War Amendments and the 
New Deal to adapt the Constitution to the new needs of the people.  “How, then, should 
we assess Ackerman’s contention that 1936 was a constitutional moment?  Without 
doubt, he goes much too far in maintaining that the American people were consciously 
amending the Constitution in 1936.”60
 Clearly, legal opinions cannot continue to keep their value once a new political 
regime replaces the old regime. But change in law does not come as quickly as it does in 
politics. Hence, many intervening factors, along with the natural replacement of Court 
justices, can lead to change in Court direction which goes on outside the parameters of 
the People demanding such and such changes be made in a simple causation model.
       It is also not clear as to how controversial subjects can easily be reflected in legal 
doctrine that are not clearly resolved one way or another in the greater public arena. For 
example, not only has the Supreme Court thwarted the march of “We the People” 
towards democratization, but even if it served to move in that direction, as was the case 
with the civil rights cases such as Brown v. Board of Education,61 such movement proved 
fruitless because the Supreme Court could not democratize practices that were embedded 
in particular histories.  According to Ackerman, cases like Brown, Griswold v. 
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 Leuchtenburg, p. 2113.
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 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (The Court held that segregation of children solely on the basis of race, even though 
the schools were of equal quality, did violate the students rights of equal educational opportunities.)
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Connecticut,62and Roe v. Wade63 are synthesizing cases or consolidating cases rather than 
markers for major shifts in constitutional law.  So how is it possible for the Court to 
divine the law in controversial cases?  Why would the Court bother to decide such 
conflicts without clear direction from the democratic principles as laid out by the major 
political parties?
      However, whether these cases should be seen as synthesizing cases or major markers 
of American constitutional law is controversial, because each resulted from a prolonged 
effort by civil rights movements, women’s movements, and feminist advocacy groups 
that challenged the original Constitution in ways that would have never occurred to the 
original drafters. 
     Certainly blacks and women were excluded from participating in or allowed to sit at 
the original drafting of the Constitution.  It required many decades of struggle for these 
groups to gain constitutional recognition and to further consolidate those gains.  But for 
Ackerman, the Civil Rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s and the feminist 
movement in the 1960s and 1970s, or an earlier generation of women’s movements 
seeking the vote, are considered by Ackerman as the privileged beneficiaries of the 
Reconstruction and New Deal constitutional alignments.  This seems to be reading 
history backwards—but skipping over the struggles of African-Americans or women’s 
movement for equality.
     Ackerman’s hope that the legal community will recognize his one-Constitution/three-
regime theory remains elusive, despite his critique of those legal scholars whom he refers 
62
 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (The Court held that a Connecticut statute that prohibited the distribution of birth 
control as a violation of the privacy clause of the Ninth Amendment.)
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 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (The Court held that a Texas statute violated a woman’s right to an abortion as a 
violation of Due Process and Privacy Clauses of the Fourteenth and Ninth Amendments. The protection of 
“person” did not include the unborn as found in the Fourteenth Amendment.)
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to as sticklers for original text.  He seems to be of the opinion that simply because formal 
changes are made to the constitutional document or a switch in time either via the 
President after the Civil War or the Justices during the Great Depression, leads to 
changes in fact.  But, formal changes are made to documents does not mean that changes 
in circumstance follow. 
     Ackerman seems to have the optimistic view that changes in legal structure do,
indeed, indicate the coming forth of new regimes, a sort of predetermined or manifest 
destiny to the further democratization of the original Constitution.  “Yet I find 
Ackerman’s account over-determined.  It overemphasizes the role of the Court in 
bringing about social change that Ackerman considers positive.”64
     Cases following a Civil War and the Great Depression do not suggest the deep and 
foundational changes that Ackerman proclaims.  He seems to feel that lawyers and 
judicial folk are slow to recognize the major changes to the Constitution as a consequence 
of the Civil War and the Great Depression.  The Supreme Court decisions during and 
after these major upheavals in American society did not result in furtherance of the 
democratization of the original Constitution.  And, at best, Court opinion after these
major social shakeups is mixed.
     Further, Ackerman believes that We the People, as citizens, are empowered to go 
beyond the formalist criteria in making drastic changes to earlier legal documents when 
we are called into action during times of trouble or stress by the politicians.  He charges 
those sticklers that closely adhere to the original specifications of the Constitution of 
being hypertextualists.  “This is Ackerman’s belief that ‘hypertextualism’ and allied 
64
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approaches are incompatible with the empirical facts of a living and changing 
constitutional order.”65
     He believes that in practical affairs, people are empowered to go beyond Article Five 
in making changes to the Constitution.  He claims this is already what happened with the 
Civil War Amendments and with the New Deal.  Deep fundamental changes were made 
to the original document by going outside its four corners.  In both of these instances, 
extra-legal means were used to effectuate the change.  The same could be said about the 
Articles of Confederation—when it came to making changes, the Founders proceeded by 
extra-legal means to bring forth the new Constitution. 
     Ackerman justifies each of these innovative and creative techniques in amending the 
Constitution on the ground that ultimately the People were brought into the process, and 
they legitimized the outcomes of the Constitution, the Reconstruction Amendments, and 
the New Deal.  In other words, even if changing the Constitution or drafting a new 
Constitution exceeded the formal procedures for making changes to these documents, it 
was, nevertheless, justified because the People were called upon to endorse and 
legitimize the end product.  Thus, the process may have been illegal, but the end product 
was ultimately sanctioned by those that ultimately count, We the People.
     So, first, Ackerman makes a mistake with regard to his historiography of American 
constitutional law; that is, Ackerman seems to adopt a sort of Hegelian dialectical 
interpretation of history, as a sort of inevitable movement toward greater 
democratization.  “Ackerman is motivated to focus on transformative moments precisely 
because he fears the implications of simply accepting the idea that constitutional 
65
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principles are historically contingent.”66  And, second, Ackerman appropriates and 
misuses a key concept in his analysis of American constitutionalism.  He appropriates the 
ideas of “democracy” in his characterization of the American system of government.  
This distortion is in need of a remedy. Ackerman first targets those legal scholars who 
see the Civil War Amendments as a mere continuation of the original Constitution, such 
as Justice Black, who would be labeled a hypertexualist by him.  Second, Ackerman 
targets the Wilsonians, as adherents of monistic government, with violating the 
separation of powers.  Ackerman adopts Madison’s position via The Federalist 67 to 
contest the collapsing of political authority in the way suggested by President Wilson.68
Ackerman seems to want to modernize Madison into a supporter of his dualist 
democracy.  Yet under no circumstances could Madison support the People participating 
in politics.  According to Madison, the People should be able to participate in politics at 
the most minimal level and very few members of the populace actually qualified to 
participate in the political arena. Slaves, women, indigent men, natives, etc. were not 
qualified to participate in a Madisonian democracy.  Only the elite and those with 
property qualified to participate in the political arena.69
     The Founders inherent fear of centralized authority or the amassing of majority power 
in the hands of ordinary citizens translated into a Federalist republic, with checks and 
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balances, and the separation of powers.  Also, the Founders had to deal with the practical 
task of uniting the States beyond the loose links established by the Articles of 
Confederation.  The citizens of the thirteen separate and independent states saw 
themselves as citizens of their respective states rather than as Americans. 
     The fear of concentrated power has dissipated since the Founders drafted the 
Constitution, not because of changes in human nature during the 200-year span, but 
because of technological and industrial advances.  The private sector has advanced to the 
point that public space is only of secondary importance in the ordering of people’s 
lives.70  Government simply serves as a traffic officer and umpire in a world dominated 
by private business and industry.  Private industry and corporations have rewritten the old 
fashioned territorial boundaries that were monitored via nation-states.  The protection of 
the physical borders is less of a priority than the protection of intellectual property.  
Consequently, the agrarian society, in which the original Federalist Constitution was 
developed, has passed from the scene.
     At bottom, Ackerman’s thesis is that citizen participation is not dead.  That is, 
although he recognizes the empirical evidence with respect to the decline of citizen 
participation, he, nevertheless, goes on to explain this decline in the following way:  Even 
though citizen participation is needed for the government to be labeled a “democracy,” 
this does not mean that citizens must participate in everyday politics.  Citizens may 
delegate this responsibility to the professional politicians.  So, even though day-to-day 
citizen participation is low in American politics, it does not negate the label that 
Americans choose to describe their government.  Although it is not a direct democracy, it 
can faithfully and accurately be labeled a “representative democracy” because citizens 
70 GRANT MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (VINTAGE BOOKS 1966).
38
are the ultimate sovereign.  Is Ackerman attempting to explain dualist democracy a way 
of justifying and salvaging the label of “democracy” even though he is fully aware that 
citizens have little interest or inclination in participating in the political arena? 
     In short, Ackerman’s thesis is that although citizen participation in politics has 
declined, we can still characterize the American government as a “democracy” because 
citizens play a key role during those critical moments in American constitutional 
history—where their turnout is crucial to legitimizing a particular course of action or 
policy.  That is, citizens are busy people; they have lives to live; they hardly have the 
time to constantly engage in day-to-day politics.  What is puzzling and needs to be 
fleshed out is that Ackerman seems to perfectly understand the lack of citizen 
participation, citizen interest, and sufficient citizen information to elect representatives to 
speak for him or her.  Yet Ackerman still depends and relies on citizen participation as 
the key to transformative government.  How does the lack of citizen participation in 
politics affect Ackerman’s thesis of dualist constitutionalism to speak for We the People?
      As indicated above, Ackerman is well aware of the problem of citizen participation.  
He seems to recognize, correctly, that deterioration of citizenship participation poses 
serious problems in establishing and maintaining “democratic” institutions.  However, I 
have argued that despite Ackerman’s correct evaluation of data, suggesting the neglect 
and relative ignorance of citizens regarding the political world, Ackerman has not 
completely understood or come to terms with the fundamental problems involving 
democratic principles.  If all citizens know about politics is paying taxes and compulsory 
jury service, the assumption that they care about government outside their pocket book or 
with issues that do not tangentially affect them seems reasonable. 
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     Why should government press more for their attention than private industry or non-
profit corporation? Citizens that are looking for safety, putting food on the table, and 
pursuing their goals, unhindered by either the public sector or the private sector, have no 
need to privilege one over the other.  Pluralists recognized this as far back as the 1950s—
that the government can be seen as just one more interest group competing with many 
other interest groups for citizen attention and dollars.  If a corporation is best able to 
provide these goods to the citizenry, and the public sector is simply perceived as taxing 
them, then why would citizens be more loyal to the government over a corporation that 
clothes, feeds, and protects their financial security? Of course, this is only a rough 
analysis of day-to-day living. It excludes a consideration of the government’s overall 
contribution to the private sector by making it possible for corporations to operate in the 
first place.
     It appears that Ackerman is well aware of his critic’s charges with regard to his 
excessive reliance on American exceptionalism, the growth of democracy, and 
patriotism.  Ackerman is aware of those that claim his optimistic march of democracy is 
blinded only by his patriotism.  Ackerman replies thus:  “There are Whigs and there are 
Whigs.  My own version—such as it is—absolutely renounces any notion of linear 
constitutional development, and especially the whiggish conceit that this linear 
development has reached for all of us to greet Y2K as the final triumph of the American 
struggle for freedom, equality, and justice.”71
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                                      V. Conclusion
  In summary, I argued that Ackerman makes a very serious mistake in grounding his 
dualist constitutionalism on popular sovereignty.  The notion of popular sovereignty is 
controversial.  It especially poses serious problems for the Rights Foundationalists.  
Those that privilege individual rights to democratic principles are dismayed over 
Ackerman’s dualist democratic thesis, which states that basic rights that are either listed 
in the Bill of Rights or elsewhere can be overturned, removed, or amended in accordance 
with the People’s will. 
     Basically, the People rule in an Ackermanian democracy.  Ackerman does not see 
anything in the Constitution or official documents that could not be overturned by 
following his constitutional moments procedures.  For example, should a sufficient 
amount of people wish to add an amendment to the Constitution declaring Christianity 
the official religion, then so be it.72  Democracy trumps rights in the Ackermanian
universe.  The People have spoken.  Many rights foundationalists are dismayed at the 
ease by which majority rule can trump fundamental rights under Ackerman’s reading of 
the Constitution.
     His one Constitution/three regime model of American constitutional history is in need 
of close examination.  What he regards as the three constitutional moments has been
found to be either over-inclusive or under-inclusive by his critics.  Legal historians and 
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other historians have found difficulties with Ackerman’s sharp demarcation in the 
periodization of American history.73  Historians have debated whether other periods of 
American history deserve to be included in what Ackerman considers constitutional 
moments.  For example, there are historians that believe the Age of Jackson should also 
be included. Others believe that the dismantling of Reconstruction also merits inclusion 
as a constitutional moment.74
     Also, his casting of the Supreme Court in the preservationist role in codifying the 
People’s will is seriously mistaken.  Regardless of his love of the People, Ackerman 
reserved a most critical role for the Supreme Court.  He places his faith that that non-
elected institution will be able to preserve his dualist democratic principles better than 
any other.  He seems to be wedded to the proposition that the Supreme Court has done a 
reasonable good job (not a perfect job by any means) as the official interpreter and 
guardian of the American Constitution.  Therefore, he wishes the Court to continue 
serving as the People’s preservationist institution.  However, scholars and other 
thoughtful people over the generations would not be as optimistic or enthusiastic as 
Ackerman in casting the Supreme Court as the guardian of the People’s will. 
     I have attempted to illustrate in this brief reply and overview that his faith in the 
Supreme Court is not justified. Ackerman uses the mask of a dualist constitutionalism to 
evade the central problem of American constitutionalism:  that popular sovereignty plays 
no role, or only a small role, in constitutional politics.  But, in order to mask the small 
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interest in citizen participation in public affairs, Ackerman establishes an elaborate 
dualist constitutional model to hide the non-democratic nature of American government.  
That is, in order to explain this lack of citizen participation in matters political, Ackerman 
develops an elaborate scheme of dualist democracy as a cover for political legitimacy.
